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The Saxon Iings by virtue of thoqoyal rerogative
occasionally granted relief in tios dases.which were without
remedy in the conrts. Williae I and his irinediates success-
ore also Eranted relief in llh. cases and in substantially
the sme ianner. But the exercise of this judicial prerog-
ative gradually becoming burdensome to the kings was frequent-
ly delegated to the chancellor or other court officers.
1ntil Edward III in the twenty-second year of his reign order-
ed that"all. seh natters as were of Grace should be referred
to and dispatched by the Chancellor or the keeper of the
Privy Beal"and thereby establisaan equity court. Which
despite vigorous attacks at times has stood through the sue-
eeeding centuries aiding in.the developuent bf a rapidly ex-
panding c@buntry and ofefctually neeting the needs of an ad-
vancing eciilization. It is probable that for some time
prior to the establishment of.a court of equity mistake was
one groumdfor the exercise of the king's judicial power.
It is stated by a recent writer that, IrFrom the timte when
Jurlsdiction was TjorMally delegated to the chancellor by the
crown, mistake has I'a*-oyd a ilost important Vart as the coas-
ion of equitablo riChts and duties r1 for thu oxerclse of
3insdietion in awarding equitable ro-erdios. In the earlier
periods, when the deolmlA:S of the law courts ai,.d the court of
ehancery were sharply diT.-en the cori.Cr. law
Judges were not influenced by equitable nations, this branch
of equitable jurisprudence and jurisdiction consisted entire-
ly in the means by which certain iarties were irevented from
holding and enjoying legal rights and certain other parties
were relieved fxom the birden of legal duties and liabilities,
which 'had originated under a uistake and which were complete
and unassailable at law. In the progress of time as the
eonron lakw became more and more conformed to equitable prin-
elples, the leral tribunals assuried a partial cognizance and
gave a partial relief in cases involving mistake. "(a)
A eomyrehensive dIefinition of mistake is the one give by
Prof. Pmeroy: "'12ist ae, therefore, within the ioaing of
equity and as the occasion of jurisdiction, is.an erroneous
mental condition, conceptln, or conviction i,,duced by ig-
norance 1 isa-prehension, or misunderstanding of the truth,,
but without negligenco, and resulting in soiie act or omipion$j
done or suffered erroneously by one or both of tie' parties to
a transaction, but without its o'ronleos character being in-
(a) Pormercy on fquity Jtrirude.ce Zoc. O 3.
tended or known at the timo.*(a) It seems mnecessary
however that the words "but without negligence" should have
been inserted for all o1.thc oquitablo riaxims al;l, y as a
matter of course and "tquity aids the vigilant" is partie-
ularly applicable. Indeod raost oases of mistake are oases
in which the ignorance, misapprehension or misunderstanding
of the truth is due in some degree to negligence. There. can
be no doubt thqt courts will not relieve a Darty from ,his
mitake if they deem that he ws negligent but it certainly
is true that not all acts dohe or omissions suffered are
deemed negligent. It is also certain that no court will
degree relief unless the mIstake Is tnaterial and is shown by
the mst clear and convincing proof. In the dollowing dis-
oussion only mistakes made by a party or parties to an agree-
ment are considered. A mistake may be imaterial because
It is of so little tportance that the rights of parties of
parties are practically the sane in law whether or not re-
formation is decreed or when the loss to the aggrieved party
is so inconsiderable that the coirt will not consider the
matter.
4A the ease of Rue v Ueirs, 43 N.J.Zq. 377, it was sought
t ,tive-'tho eourt Jurisdiction by asking a reformation Of
(Rt) Poneroy on Equity Jurinionce, GOO.8M.
the Instrment bocause the words 1"arty of the first part I
were used where clearly the words "iVarty.of the secon Part"
were intended. The Now Jersey couitt refused to take juis-
dietion on the grrand that the mistake was immatorial and
that it did no injury. The court said, "But these mistakes
are palpable and do not create the slightest obscurity as to
the maning of the contract, nor prevent it from being so
eonstrued as to give full effect to the real intention of
parties. It is a rule of construction of universal apili-
eatiox, that a contract notwithstanding mistakes therein
shall If the maeaning of the martios 'Lo clarly discerrod be
construed as near the nind and al,1arent intent of the partis
as It possibly nay be, and the law will permit. The sub-
seq1ient parts o this contract express the intention of the
parties In language so clear, siuple and exilicit that it
must in its 1resent form be izderstood and construed Just
exactly as it would be afiter it. was reformed. Where that is
the case reformation can aoo-z1lJ4.sh nothing ........ A imistake
which is harmless and does no Injury needs no correction.
"iis court cannot take Jurisdiction on theotrourzd."
A Virginia .de observed in the ase of Weaver v Carter,
10 Lee 3, "IHence our courts have wisely said that even in
sales strictly by the acre :w coia. nation is to be made for
defieiency where the su?-?osed dIefiait Iay fairly oe b resumed
to arise merely from tho variations of instruments or of
mensurat ion. I
A mistake also nay le iiaterial because it is not *lose-
ly enough connectod with th stbjeat natter of the contract to
be deemed the turning point in the transaction. Unless it
is a mistake as to a necessary and intrinsic fact deemed
material by the courts they grant no relief: regardless alike
of how m-h a party may lose by his mistake or how much he
has dended upon the suni-osed state of facts in nrakirZ his
contract. The ease of Daerbann v Sehulting,, 75 N.Y¥. 55 is
in point. The defendant being insolvent was about to assign
when the plaintiff advanced hin $I0,00O. upon condition that he
shbculd be under no legal obligation to repay it providing he
paid the amount already due Ilaintiff in full. The release
given at the time contrary to the intention of the parties
was of no force. Subsequently the defendant who was then
able to Pay his debt in full al.od the plaiItiff to give him
a valid release upon payment of 1,Co . PlaintifL accepted
the proposition and did as requested. Thts action was
brought to cancel the release that the other "5OCO. might be
reeovered. The groMuids alleged were fraud ad mistake. The
eourt caa-e to the conclusion that there had beon t-o fraud and
as to the mistake the court saird, Uarl J, writing the opinio;f,
*It is further clanied that the plaintiff oueht to be entitled
to relief on account of mistake. lie testified that he would
not have executed the release, if lie had known the defenda;,t's
financial condition. But as already shown, the defendant
was In no way responsible for his ignorance ar.d was under no
legal or equitable obligation to disclose the facts as to his
pecunlary circmistarices. The pVlaintiff could have learned
the facts by inquiry of the defendant or his vendees. There
was no Piistakle an to any fact intrinsic td the release.
Plaintiff knew that the 4,ofendant had rot beem legally die-
sharged from his liability and for that the V5o00. he was to
give hin an absolute release and he gave hi. just such a re-
lease as he Intended to. There was no z-.istake of any in-
trinsic fact essential to the contract or involved therein.
The defendant's financial condition was an extrinsic fact
which xight have influenced the plaintiff's action if he had
kxown it. But ignorance of or mistp-7o as to such a &act is
Not ground for affirriative equitable relief."
It was said by :.r. Justice Swayne in the case of Gryxes v
Sanders, ot. al. O U.S. 55, 'tA ,:istake as to a hiatter of
fact, to warrant relief in equity iaxst be r-aterial and the
fact must be seh that it anir-ated an d oontrolled the con-
duet of the party. It nust go to the essence of the object
im view, and not be rt:erely incidental. The court must be sat-
that
isfied Abut for the zistake the coRi4lainant would not have
assumed the obligaticn from which he seeks to be relieved."
There is no exception to the rule that a i: .ista:.e raist be
material affectin the suobstance of a transaction or the
eourts will refuse jiursdiction.
It is also laid down in a general way that a mistake
must be mutual or the courts will not take cognizance of the
mtter. But this rule refers aore particularly to those
eases where reformation is sought. By this remedy an irnper-
feet instrument is made to speak the contract of the parties
thereby making it possible to enforce the agreement at law.
It is plain that when a reformation is decreed the mistake
mus be shown to have been nutual otherwise courts would be
engaged in making contracts for parties which they never in-
tended-and enforcing rights and granting, re.edlies on a so
called. acreezen-O whiah Lhy ;ever made. The courts seem to
make no distinction between cases in which the draughtsman
=*es a mistake and the parties,have no ehance to correct it
and those cases in which the iritiie is read by the parttes
aid they make the same mistake. in either event aeoording
to legal interpretation it is a mutual uistake.
There is a class of cases however In which refornation
is decreed where elearly there has beon actual raistake b)i
only one party to the atroozient. These are those eases in
which the party has been guilty of fraud and because of his
frauid he is estoyped fron danying that the mistake was a mut-
ral axe. The eourts .holding hisas is jlerfectly just., to
the ontraet which he fraudulently led the other party to
suppose was beilg made.
Is the somewa peculiar case of Rider v Paoill, 28 N.Y.
3lO, the Judge who wrote the prevailing. opinion seemed to
have givent this subject but little eonsideration and made ax
incorret statement of law. In the dissenting opinion a
correct statement was made as to reformation and recissiON
but the judge might have gone farther and reeoanized the fast
that ourts sometimes decree reformatio ix cases of fraud ox
one side. The plaintiff desired the reformation of a bond
which provided for payment in amnual instaluents of *3000.
with Interest only o eaeh instalment. as it became due ratter
than on th* whole, am remaining unpaid as the trial Judge
found was agreed between the parties. Baloon &. who wrote
the opinion of the eourt said, ' a not aware of any ad-
judged ease, in whlh it has been held that there must be
C mutual mistake of fast by the parties to a written contrast
or some fraud on the part of the party not mistaken to ex-
titled thi party who made the mistake axd who suffered by it,
to have such contract reformed so that it will truly express
the oral agreement of the parties which was to be earried
Into effect by tbe; written scntreaet and sueh a docetrine
would be coutrary to goad sense and soud priniple. It was
said by Mr. fustice Wright in the dissenting opinion, "A mis-
toe by the plaintiff When he made the cotrast as to the
Interest he was to reeeive ox the band and mortgage would
not entitle him to have the contract so modified as to eoxform
tO hls mistaken impression though it nIght be a ground for
rgsinding the contract on the ground that the minds of the
parties never met in making it.t The reeord states *And
finally the rule of judrment In favor of the plaintiff was
eonstrued as a finding of the r.ecessary facts viz, fraud or
mistake of fact on the part of defendant. And the judgment
of affirmance wext upon that theory.
Ix.a similar ease the appellate court concluded that two
moted did x~t eomform to the agroertent between the parties is
that they did not bear interest. The Judge who delivered
the apiniox referring to Rider v Powell, supra, said, " hile
the ground upon which the decasion was put, there being in
the ease so finding of fact Is doibtless untenable, the pria-
eiple asserted In the delsion is clearly right and sound.
It is that where a party who is to execute papers in edxsu-
mating a eoxtraet draws, or causes or procures them to be
drmam erroxeously, and alas or puts them off upox the
oppmsite party ix that shape without apprising him of the
errr or alteration, he comutts a fraud, and relief In equity
Is reforvirZ the instrument may be had on the grourd either
of mistake or fraud."
The other equitable ren-edies decreed to relieve parties
from the effeets of. their mistakes are rescission aAd cancel-
latica; these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, be-
eause the remedies .are practically the same. But teelmieally
speaking cancellation is decreed When a reformation tAght
haye been had I.e. when there was a rutual mistake or a mis-
take on oe side with fraud on the other. And rescissiou is
deereed inall other cases. It Is never necessary to show a
mutual mistake in order that the court i.ay rescii-cd the cotr-
tract. A and B enter into tr. agroee:or.t, A to trasfer cer-
tain described to D and B to build A a storehouse. A
made a mistake as to the anount of land he aereed to transfer
and B was mistaken as to the locaticr, of the storehouse. 1aeh
was mistaker as to a material fact and yet there certainly
was xot a mutual nistake. In the hypothetical case above
stated before either party had acted upon the agreement, at
the request of either equity w'tould decree a resoissiox. But
if the parties could Yot be placed in stat~u qlyo,- if either
would be substaxtially damaged by a resoissiomthe law would
enforce the contract as it appeared by the instriuiont to have
been made. In such oases equity would refuse jurisdiction
ix aceordaxce with the maxim "Maore the equities are equal
the law shall prevail." If however-A only was itistakeon and
he alone had acted on the agreement and made a transfer of
his land equity would listen to his prayer and decree a re-
scissiox of the deed.
This is the diotta of a Rhode Isla,.cd judge, "But besides
the power to reform a writing so as to Aahe it express the
agreement of both parties as it was designed to do a court of
equity has also to ios~cid and cancel an. agreenent at
the request of one party, upon the -round that, without ro&-
ligenee, he entered into it throu h a nistake of fact raretial
to the contrast, when he ean do so without injustice to the
other party."
Owint to the reluctance of the courts to base a decisiol
on the ground of mistake if any other rround cax be found and
to the fact that wher. the case is not tainted with fraud the
parties are usually willing to settle it out of court; the
great majority of cases in which reseission lias been decreed
are cases in which fraud plays soixe part. But the undoubted
right remains Ix equity to rescind awy agroement under the
limitations xotieed if mistake is clearly shown.
Yin.ta}le IE divided into tra Creat alaires. Every mis-
take is one of law or f lalt. A ristake of fact in defined
in the California Civil Code, Too. 1577 In the following
manner: "A rlistaka of feet is a mistake not caused by the
neglect of a legal duty on the piart of the person making the
mistake and consisting in: first, an unconscious ignorazce or
forgetfullness of a f-ot, , or present, material to the.
oantraot:or, second, belief in the -,resont existence of a
thim material to tie contract which does not exist, or in
the past existhad o' s'u1&i a tiig which *-Aas not existed."
The eases are nmierous rhich hold that nistake as to
matters of fact are always ground for relief. "The cases
found on mistake seem to rest on t his principle: that if
:artio ' Jelieving that a certain state of things exist, come
to an agreement with such l'ellef for its basis, on discover-
ing their mutual error, they are remitted to their original
rights (a). A mistake as to foreign law is considered a
mistake of fact.(b} *It is an elementary principle that,
money 'paid IMder a mistako of taterial facts, where the
party raying derives no benefit, ray be recovered back."(Co)
MIstake of law may be dofined an arn erroneous conclusion
as to the legal effect of known facts. One of the great
mazitns of El~lish and AxaericaL law is;, "Ignorantia juris non
excusat." For this 1rinc 1le 's for many others we are in-
debted to the Romans. It Is obvious that If ignorance of
the law ras allowed as a sufficient excuse for breaking a
contraot parties would practically have their op*ion as to
whether they would break it or-not. And it is impossible to-
forsee all the consequences which would result from allowing
men to avoid their afroomeWtS and annul their contracts, onxt-
the plea that they did not understand the law. Soe able
judges have hold that this maxim oltly ap-lies to orimlnal,' .
(a) Mwratt v Wright., I Wend.356;(b) See 9 Pickering 111.
(cia SBarb.223, se( also 25 N.Y.239.
cases. In Cooper v Phibbs, L.R. 2 H.L. 140, Lord Westbury
said, WIt to said lignorantia juris haud excusat', but in
that maxim the '!us' is ured in the sense of denoting general
law the ordinary law of the country. But when the word jus
is used in the sense of denotirg pLrivato right tbh maxim has
no apmlieation.w
In the case of Chamilin v Laytin, I Edw. Ch.467, the
Jndge after ueferring to several cases which did not fully
sustain hls position said, "I think these causes are muffio-
lent to establish the correctness of the position, that a
contract entered into under a mutual misconception of l.gal
rights, amunting to a mistake of law in both the oontraoting
parties by which the objeoct and .d of their contract accord-
Ing tjs inytt Rnd nMAjRiM,,j c~ulat, be :1coomplished, Is -as
liable to be Set aside or roscinded as a contract founded In
utstae of matters Of fact. This aairt has te same jower
to grant relief in t-ej one as in the other." This case was
stwtained by the highest court but as distinctly stated not
on the ground of mistake of law. U r Justice Bronson who
wrote the opinion said, 'The maxin, ignorantia legis non e.-
ousat is untformiy aiplied in the administration of criminal
laws, and I m at a loss to conceive why the fi tness of the
ruile should ever havo been doubted in civil casos."(a)
In the 1jarticular case just referred to, the decision was
not placed on the Projer ground in the lower court and the
statement made by the vice chancellor was too broad to be
sustained by the weight of authority. There. is however no
doubt that thore arI ontLe excotions to the rule in civil
cases. For in the best considered modern decisions it has
been laid down that there may be relief on the grond of mis-
take induced by ignorance or mistake of law pure and s5ipe.(b)
1istakes of law may be divided into two classes, 1. Those
mztakes made by a party entering into a contract in regard
to his own anteceodont existing legal rights although he know-
the full legal effect of the present transaction; 2. Those
mistakes made by a party as to the legal of a trans-
action in Which he is about to engage although he has full
knowledge as to all of his ikrior existing lgal rights and
readies. An excellent illustration of the first class of
mistakes is the much criticlsed case of Lansdown v Lansdown,
I Mosely's Reortr 3C3. The whole case as there reported is
as follows. There were four brothers, the second died, and
the eldest brother enters upon his lands, the youngest
(a) 18 Tend. 407. Rt T.. 412.
brother claims a title, upon which they appy to Hugher a
schoolmaster, their neighbor in th' -,at.;try (who cted as an
attorneyl for hio opiniAon, who ui.on conmilting a book called
The Clerk's 1Remenbrancer, gav it in favor of the youngest
brother, because lands could not ascend; upon which the eld-
est brother agreed to d4- the estate with the youngest and
declared he would rather 6o so, thei go to law, though he had
the right: Ujon which ,:r. Lughes prepred deeds of lease
and release of the moiety, which -rore executed by the eldest
brother, and bonds for the -enalty of 30, It whiah was corr-
puted to be the value of the moiety, conditioned for the
qviet enjoyment of their respect ive shares; the youngest
brother died and the moiety descended or. the defendant, the
infant, hi son and heir: And thi Lord Chancellor decreed
that the bond and deeds of leane and release, should be
delivered up to the jilpintiff, the eldest brother, being ob-
tained by mistake and Aisrepresentation and that the defendant
the infant, when he oavao of age should convey nisi, & and
his lordshij said, That mnaxim of law, Ignor~ntia Juris non
ex~crat ras in regard to th public, that ignorance cannot be
pleaded in excuse of crines, but did not hold in civil cases?
Probably no court would go further than w.s done in this
ease but there is a growing tendency to grant relief in cases
of this class, some courts construing the mistake as one of
fact and others squarely holding that they would relieve
parties frOM the effects of such mirtakes of Jaw.
The second class of cases is illustrated by the widely
cited case of HUnt v Roufuzaniere's Adm., I Peters 1. In
almost every case of mistake arising in the United States
since this one was decided either one party or the other has
found occasion to refer to it. And sometimes both sides
have found it useful. An Ohio jiyge said of the case, "It is
cited by both the partnes in this case to show that equity
will and will not relieve against a mistake of law merely.1t(a)
The fact that the case was twice before the 3ureme Court of
the United I~4probably largely accounts for such a use of
it.
These are the essential facts of the case. The con-
plainant lent money to the defendant's Intestate and after
taking the advice of counsel decided to take security in the
form of an irrevocable power of attorney to sell certain ves-
sls and apply the proceeds to the debt. The case was first
before the court on an wpl.eal from a decree sustaining a de-
mmrrer and dismissing the bill. In reversing the decree of
(a 1 !c Naihgten et.al. v Partrirce ot.al.,li Ohio Z25
th1e Circult Court, the Supreme Court said; i:r. Chief Justice
Marz'x.1t delivering the ol!Anon, "We find no case which we
thirk precisely in point; and are unwilling where the effect
of the instrument is acknowledged to have beenr ontirely mis-
understood by the parties, to say that a Court of equity is
incalable of affording relief.'1(a) At the trial it was ad-
mitted that the parties to this agreement acted under a mut-
ual mistake as to the lar, neither knowing that this power of
attorney could be revoked by the death of Rousmaniere. Mr.
J ustice Washington in the opinion of the court which he de-
livered made a very clear and comprehensive statement of the
law of mistake. fe said, "There are certain principles of
equity, applicable to this question, which, as general priny
ciples we hold to be incontrovertible. The first is, that
where an instrument is drawn and exeeiuted, which professes,
or is iltended, to carry into execution, an agreement, whether
in Writing or parol, previously entered into, but which by
Mristake of the draug-tsman, elther as to fact or law, does
not fulf ill or which violates the manifest intention of the
parties to the agreement, equity will correct the mistake so
as to produce a conformity of the instrut.ent to the agreement.
The reason is obvious- the - executiont 3f agreements, fair-
ly and legally entered into, ix one of the peoullar branches.
of equity lurisdiction, and If the instrtinont which is in-
tended to execute the agreement, be, from any cause, insuf-
ficient for that purpose, the agreement remains as much Um-
executed, as if one of the parties had refused, altogether,
to comply -with his engagement,-and a Court of Equity will, in
the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction, afford relief
in the one ease, as well a. in the other, by compelling the
delinquent party fully to perform his agreement, according to
the terms of it, and to the manifest intentior of the prtis.
So, if the mistake exist not in the instrument which is In-,,
tended to give effect to the agreement, but in the agreement
Ltself and An clearly proved to have been tip. result of- ig-.
noranoe of soxe material fact, a Court of Equity will, in
general, grant relief, according to the nature of the lartie-
ular case in which it is sought.
Further on tho learnod Judge continues, "That the ceneral
intention of the prtios was, to 1 rovide a security as effectual
as a mortgage of the vessel would be canadmit of no doubt,
and if such had been their ag20,-munt, the insuffieienoy of
the Instruments to effect that obJect which were afterwards
prepared, would have furnishod a tround for the interposition
of a Court of Equity, which the representitives of Roxsmaniere
could not easily have resisted. But the plaintiff was 
not
satisfied to leave the kind of security which he was willing
to receive, undetermined; having finally made up his mind, by
the advice of his counsel, not to accet of a mortgage or
bill of salein nature of a mortgage. He thought it safedi,
therefore,- to desigzate the Instrument; and, having deliber-
at ey done so, it met the view of both jartles, and was as
cor4e tely incorporated Into their agreement, as were Ahe
notes of hand for the sia intended to be secured. In coming
to this agreement It is not pretended that the plaintiff was-
misled by ignorance of any fact, connected with the ageient
vWich he was about to conclude. If, then, the agreement was
not founded upon a mistake of eny material fact, and it was
executed in strict conformity with itself; we think it would
be unprecedented, for a Court of Equity to decree another
sec=ity to be given, not only different from that which had
beeh agreed upon, but one which had been deliberately cor-'"
efdered and rejectOd'by t%0 : artio not arking for relief; or
to treat the case, as if such sther sxOurity had In fact been
agreed upon and executodf
On page 16 of the same case, tho court said, "It is not
the intention of the C o .rt, in the case n6w under consider-
ation to lay it down, t.-At thre iy not be cres in which a
Court of Equity will relieve aEairnt a plain niztake, arising
from irnorance of law. But we mean to say, that where the
parties, upon deliberetion and advice, reject one species of
secrity and agree to seleat another, umder a misapprehension
of the law as to the nature of the security so selected, the
Court of Equity will not, on the ground of such misapprehen-
sion, and the insufficiency of such xecurity in consequence
of a subsequent event, not forseen, perhaps, or thought of,
direct a new security, of a different character, to be given,
or decree that to be done which the parties supposed would
havq 'been ef f qtqd,,1 fby , ,qZn~txument VI~ich -was finally agreed
rnpqn. "I(a)
In this second class of oases all courts seem to take the
position held in Hunt v Rousmaniere, su1ira, that.parties will
not be relieved from nistakes of law, when they have deliber-
ately chosen one course in 1preforence to anather. But when
they have not deliberated on their course and agree that a
certain thing shall be done in order to fulj'y carry out their
contract, having absolntoly no doubt or question as to its
22
being te pwoper legal aourse mni it subsequently turns out
$?et they have labored nnmler e iirlstakeo, *ourts differ greatly
a to whether reliof shozdl bo Cranted or not.
